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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Shawn Lowe appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress.  
Because we lack a sufficient record to decide the legal issues presented in this appeal, we 
will vacate and remand the matter to enable the District Court to make specific written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
I 
Lowe was indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on one count of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The 
charge stemmed from an encounter in the early morning hours of September 9, 2010, 
during which the Philadelphia police recovered a gun from Lowe’s person after receiving 
an anonymous tip that someone matching his description and location was in possession 
of a firearm.  Shortly after the indictment issued, Lowe filed a motion to suppress, 
arguing that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify their Terry stop of 
Lowe. 
The District Court held a hearing on the motion to suppress at which three police 
officers and Lowe’s girlfriend, Tamika Witherspoon, testified regarding the September 9 
encounter.  Significant to our decision here, each witness gave accounts of the events that 
varied in significant respects.  For example, the witnesses differed as to, inter alia: 
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(1) when Lowe complied with the officers’ commands to freeze; (2) when Lowe 
complied with the officers’ commands to raise his hands; (3) whether and when the 
officers brandished firearms; and (4) whether and when Lowe voluntarily placed his 
hands on the wall.  Following this testimony, the District Court heard argument from both 
sides and, at the conclusion of the hearing, denied the motion to suppress.  With regard to 
the seizure, the Court stated: 
They ask your client to remove his hands, and based on the testimony that 
is presented here he failed to present his hands. 
 
I say based on that the police had reasonable suspicion to believe that he 
was carrying a gun, and for their own safety and precaution they had the 
right to search him. . . . 
 
This Court will further supplement the record in reference to findings of 
fact and conclusions of law as it relates to this motion to suppress. 
 
App. 216–17.  Despite its statement to the contrary, the District Court did not issue 
written findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
On November 28, 2011, Lowe pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with 
the Government, in which Lowe reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  This appeal followed. 
 4 
 
II
1
 
On appeal, Lowe argues that the gun should have been suppressed because the 
police seized him before they had reasonable suspicion to effectuate the Terry stop that 
led to recovery of the gun.  As is typical in these sorts of cases, determining the moment 
of seizure is a fact-bound inquiry that depends not only upon what happened during the 
encounter between Lowe and the police, but also upon the sequence of those events.  
Because the events of September 9 are in dispute, we cannot adequately review the 
matter without specific findings of fact. 
We acknowledge, of course, that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not 
require a district court to make written findings of fact; rather, they require the court to 
“state its essential findings on the record.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(d).  Typically, when the 
district court makes no written findings of fact, we will “extract findings from his oral 
decision at the hearing,” In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 396 (3d Cir. 2006), and 
“we view the evidence in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision,” 
United States v. Gomez, 846 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. 
Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 740 (9th Cir. 1985)).  In cases such as this one, however, where 
we are presented with conflicting versions of complex historic facts in the context of 
difficult legal questions, remand is the most appropriate decision.  See, e.g., In re Adan, 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and we exercise plenary review of 
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437 F.3d at 398 & n.8 (remand to the district court to make written factual findings 
because “the complicated factual history calls for a formal, written analysis of the full 
field of evidence to . . . discharge properly our review function”); United States v. Prieto-
Villa, 910 F.2d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1990) (remand to the district court to make written 
factual findings in a suppression case because the court of appeals “cannot evaluate 
Prieto’s argument as to the existence of grounds for detention without factual findings as 
to what happened when the police arrived”). 
This case is akin to the cases just cited.  Four different witnesses testified, and 
each gave an account of the events that differed from those of the others in important 
respects.  Furthermore, this is not a case where we are able to infer exactly which 
witnesses the District Court credited.  Instead, we would be forced to pick and choose 
portions of each witness’ testimony without knowing whether those decisions are 
consistent with the District Court’s view of the testimony. 
In circumstances such as these, the most prudent course is to remand for the 
District Court to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law so that we may be 
able to conduct an appropriate appellate review. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the District Court’s application of law to those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
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III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order denying Lowe’s motion to 
suppress and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
United States of American v. Shawn Lowe 
No. 12-2715 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I join Judge Hardiman’s opinion, as a remand will be beneficial in developing a 
clearer factual record.  I write separately, however, because I am skeptical that any 
interpretation of the current record could support a finding that Lowe was not seized at 
the outset of his encounter with the police and before there was any reasonable suspicion. 
 Here, the police presented a clear show of authority when they approached Lowe.  
The only issue is whether (and when) Lowe submitted to that authority.  See California v. 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (explaining that a seizure is effected when a suspect 
evinces submission to a “show of authority”).  Remaining in place in response to an 
officer’s show of authority can alone be sufficient for submission.  See Johnson v. 
Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding seizure occurred when 
individual remained in his vehicle yet refused to comply with an officer’s orders to roll 
down the window); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262 (2007) (“But what 
may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of 
authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting 
in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”); United States v. 
Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 2010) (“It would be an unnatural reading of the case 
law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and 
complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands.” (emphasis in original)).   
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Although there is disagreement whether Lowe was ordered to freeze or simply to 
show his hands, I believe that either directive required—either explicitly or implicitly—
that Lowe remain in place.  Thus, if he halted and did not attempt to flee as a result of 
either instruction, this would be enough to show that he was seized at that moment.  In 
reviewing the record, this seems to be what occurred.  Indeed, I see no serious suggestion 
that this was not the case.  Even if Lowe, according to one officer, may have stepped 
backward initially on the order to stop walking, this did not undermine his submitting to 
that order.  And, to any extent Lowe merely “looked like he was getting ready to run” per 
officer testimony, App. at 78, that is immaterial, see Johnson, 620 F.3d at 692 (rejecting 
argument “that a person who has actually stopped in response to officers’ commands but 
who looks like he might run has not submitted to an order to stop” (emphasis in 
original)).   
Our decision in United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006), seems 
particularly analogous to the matter before us.  There, we concluded a clear submission 
occurred where Brown yielded to the officer’s authority by merely “turning to face the 
police car and placing (or moving to place) his hands on the vehicle.”  Id. at 246.  
Moreover, Brown’s “subsequent attempt to flee” did not erase that submission because he 
had indicated initially something more than “momentary compliance.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 Clearer factual findings will ultimately be helpful in the resolution of this matter.  
However, my view of the record in its unresolved state strongly suggests that Lowe 
effectively halted at the officers’ behest, and thus was seized at the outset of the 
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encounter.  Because there was no reasonable suspicion at that moment, see Florida v. 
J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000), this conclusion would require suppression of any 
evidence following Lowe’s seizure, and would render pointless any inquiry into hand 
movements as evasive or suspicious behavior.     
